



“The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States”

October 26, 2007

“The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States: A Brief History”

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[This document is an exclusive report produced by NEFA Foundation staff based upon exhibits published as evidence by the U.S. Justice Department in the recent case United States v. Holy Land Foundation, copies of which were obtained by NEFA. For more information on the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America, see “The Ikhwan in North America: A Short History” (August 2007) by NEFA Senior Investigator Douglas Farah and NEFA Director of Research Ron Sandee: <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefahlf0807.pdf>]

Executive Summary

On Oct. 22, 2007, a federal judge in Dallas declared a mistrial on most counts in the U.S. government’s case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development.¹ One of the individuals was found not guilty on most counts, while the jury was unable to resolve the rest of the charges. The Justice Department has announced it will retry the case.² Despite this unsatisfactory outcome for all sides, the case offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure.

During the course of the trial, federal prosecutors presented an array of internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980s and early 1990s that give a first-ever public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the *Ikhwan*, *the Group*, or *the Brotherhood*) in the U.S. over the past four decades. These documents, accepted as valid by the defendants and admitted at trial without protest, discuss recruitment; organization; ideology; and the development of the Group in different phases in the United States. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the *Ikhwan* leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources. This report is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all the material presented in the trial, or a comprehensive look at all the individuals from these groups that have direct ties to terrorist organizations. A comprehensive, annotated compilation of every significant exhibit is available on the NEFA Foundation website (www.nefafoundation.org) for further study.

The most compelling evidence of the Brotherhood’s true aims is contained in an internal memorandum written in 1991 by a senior Brotherhood leader and titled: “On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America.” In the document, the author is strikingly clear about the ultimate goal of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States:

¹ The United States of America v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al., No. 3:04-CR-240-G, United States District Court for the Northern Division of Texas, Dallas Division. All exhibits are referred to by the number assigned to them in court. They are available at the NEFA Foundation website: www.nefafoundation.org.

² Jason Trahan and Michael Grabell, “Judge Declares Mistrial in Holy Land Foundation Case,” *The Dallas Morning News*, Oct. 22, 2007.

"The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions."³

The exhibits make four things clear:

- 1) Many of the existing organizations that have set themselves up as the interlocutors between the Islamic community in the United States and the outside world (including government, law enforcement, and other faiths) were founded and controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood from their inception. Many of them changed their names over time to achieve broader national acceptance.
- 2) The Brotherhood established a highly-structured organization with many different faces inside the United States while deliberately and continually seeking to hide the Brotherhood's links to its front groups.
- 3) The agenda to be carried out by these groups in the United States in reality had little to do with the organizations' publicly-proclaimed goals, such as protecting the civil rights of Muslims. Rather, the true goal is to destroy the United States from the inside and work to establish a global Islamist society.
- 4) The primary function of the Brotherhood structures, from the early 1990s forward, was to support, materially and politically, the Hamas movement in the Palestinian territories, as instructed by the office of the general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo.

Introduction

To understand the role and importance of the Brotherhood, (officially known as *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*), it is essential to understand the history of the movement. It is not a single, monolithic organization, but rather a collection of some 70 national organizations with competing interests and desires. The headquarters is in Egypt and the international directorate is based in Europe.⁴ The Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in response to the then-recent collapse of the Muslim Caliphate. Al-Banna called for establishment of a world Islamic state governed by Koranic law, ruled by a single caliph. The Brotherhood's creed is: "God is our objective; the Koran is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; *jihad* is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations."⁵

The Brotherhood took a sharply anti-Western tone under the ideological influence of Sayyid Outb. In a seminal 1946 article published in the Egyptian magazine *al-Risala*, after visiting the United States, Outb wrote: "All Westerners are the same: a rotten conscience, a false civilization. How I hate these Westerners, how I despise all of them without exception." He came to believe the world was in a state of *jahiliyyah* or the primitive savagery of pre-Islamic revelation and that Muslims had lost their way, in large part because of Western influences.

Outb's thinking crystallized in a slim tract, now his most enduring work, titled "Milestones," which outlines not only the dismal state of the world, but the duty of Islam to dispel the darkness by spreading Islam by whatever means available. All non-Islamic states, including that of his native Egypt, were deemed illegitimate. Only the Koran and its laws were viewed as legitimate.⁶ Outb was hanged in 1966, but his book has remained in print in many languages, and is sold on Muslim Brotherhood websites and in mosques around the world. The book can be found here: <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/MB/Milestones.pdf>.

³ Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.21.

⁴ Muslim Brotherhood homepage:
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/MB/ummahnet.pdf>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The most readily available version of the book is published by the Mother Mosque Foundation of Cedar Rapids, IA.

Many of the Brotherhood's early leaders, who opposed both colonialism and the secular regimes in which they lived, were killed and others driven out of their homelands. Many of the survivors, including scores of highly-educated men with skills lacking in much of the Arab world, eventually found refuge in Saudi Arabia, where the anti-Western *wahhabi* establishment welcomed them. In the 1970s, flush with cash from the first oil boom and deeply disturbed by the successful Islamic revolution in Shi'ite Iran, Saudi leaders set out to spread their own conservative brand of Sunni Islam.

Brotherhood activists helped launch the largest Saudi charities, including the Muslim World League and World Assembly of Muslim Youth, all closely tied to the conservative Saudi clergy. Branches of these groups would later be implicated in funding al Qaeda.⁷ A non-exhaustive list of the militant Islamists and organizations that emerged from the Brotherhood's ranks include many now-familiar names: Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheik" responsible for killing hundreds of civilians and serving a life sentence in New York for planning terrorist attacks in the United States; the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), founded and funded by the Brotherhood in 1987, to destroy Israel; Ayman Zawahiri, founder of the Brotherhood-based Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and currently Osama bin Laden's chief deputy; Abdullah Azzam, who went on to Afghanistan and eventually became a co-founder of al Qaeda; and Hassan al-Turabi, bin Laden's benefactor and host during his stay in Sudan.⁸ Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks, told U.S. interrogators he was drawn to violent *jihad* in Kuwait after joining the Brotherhood and attending its desert youth camps.⁹ Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon accused Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, the alleged mastermind of the March 11, 2004 attack on a Spanish train that killed 198 people, and others implicated in the attack, of belonging to the Brotherhood.¹⁰

Lesser known figures in the United States but prominent in the Brotherhood who have been designated as terrorist supporters by the U.S. Treasury Department and the United Nations include: Yousef Nada, an Egyptian and naturalized Italian citizen who joined the Brotherhood at 16 and identifies himself as the Brotherhood's foreign minister; and his frequent business partner, Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, a wealthy Eritrean.¹¹

The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States

The U.S. Chapter of the international Muslim Brotherhood was formed in the 1960s, according to the documents presented during the HLF trial. This coincides with increasing repression of the Brotherhood in Egypt, where the movement was born, as well as increasing pressure in other secular Arab states. As a result, many Brotherhood members moved to the more hospitable environment of Saudi Arabia.

During the first years in the United States, the *Ikhwan* were only loosely organized. A U.S. chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood was formed in the early 1960s after hundreds of young Muslims came to the U.S. to study, particularly at large Midwestern universities in Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. The center of activity was the Muslim Students Association, founded in 1963. Some

⁷ John Mintz and Douglas Farah, "In Search of Friends Among the Foes," *The Washington Post*, Sept. 11, 2004, p. A1.

⁸ These and other ties are outlined in several articles, including: Mintz and Farah, op cit; Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "Jihad's Long Reach," *Newsweek*, Sept. 17, 2003; Farah, op cit., pp 145-157.

⁹ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 145.

¹⁰ Ministracion de Justicia, Juzgado Central de Instruccion No. 005, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 0000035/2001 E.

¹¹ U.S. Treasury Department Statement on Terrorist Designations, Aug. 12, 2002; Mark Hosenball with Kevin Peraino and Catherine Skipp, "Is al Taqwa, a Shadowy Financial Network, a Secret Money Machine for Osama bin Laden?" *Newsweek*, March 25, 2002, p. 28.

belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood in their homelands and wanted to spread its ideology here.¹²

In the 1970s a new influx of Muslim Brothers from the Middle East first created tensions but in the end developed a more professional organization. Years later, the leader of the organization office of the U.S. chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, identified as Zeid al-Noman, said the first gathering of Islamic activists was loose-knit:

“So, the first generation of the Muslim Ikhwan in North America composed of a team which included he who was an Ikhwan in his country or he who was a member of The Worshipers of the Merciful Group or he who doesn’t have a direction but who is active in Islamic activism.”¹³

A historical outline of the U.S. Brotherhood’s achievements, written on October 25, 1991, as an internal work paper to the Shura Council of the group in the U.S. states: “In 1962, the Muslim Students Union was founded by a group of the first Ikhwan in North America and the meetings of the Ikhwan became conferences and Students Union Camps.”¹⁴ Zeid al-Noman indicates that the first Muslim brothers who came to the United States were still seen as members of the Muslim Brothers of their country of origin. If a Muslim Brother came from a country that had no large “gathering” in the U.S., he was advised to associate with the “nearest movement to them. So, for instance, an Iraqi might have joined Jordan’s Ikhwan and, for instance, a Libyan might associate with Egypt’s Ikhwan and so forth.”¹⁵

“The Movement went through different organizational formats. One of the first organizational formats tried here were the regional gatherings as each movement had (...) with a leadership and the collection of this leadership formed Groups or what is called the Coordination Council. There were meetings and the resolutions of that Council were non-binding for its members.”¹⁶

Later a more formal structure was created and according to the bylaws and Zeid al-Noman “the highest organization in the Group is the Organizational Conference. The Organizational Conference is a stemming from the Ikhwan bases; every Usra elects one or two according to its number. (...) After that, the Shura Council comes then the Executive Council.”¹⁷ The conditions for being recruited by the movement were formalized, and the identification of these groups with the Muslim Brotherhood was solidified, as outlined below:

“During this stage, the name of this gathering was not important but the affiliation with the Ikhwan’s name was am (sic) affiliation due to the size of thought of this Movement. (...) This was the reason for which the name “The Muslim Brotherhood” was adopted as a basis for this work. (...) There was an attempt to change the name of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement to The Islamic Movement... As for recruitment in the ranks of this Movement, its main condition was that a brother must be active in the general activism in the MSA, a person who attends its general conferences or participating in its executive committees, whether local or central, and this was the Movement’s condition in the 60’s. (...) Recruitment used to take place in the following format: attending the MSA conferences and choosing active Arab elements and approaching them to join the Ikhwan. This was followed by visits to the local branches and, consequently, choosing active elements over there and approaching them to join the Ikhwan.”¹⁸

¹² Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe and Laurie Cohen, “A Rare Look at Secretive Brotherhood in America,” *The Chicago Tribune*, Sept. 19, 2004; Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.2.

¹³ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.2.

¹⁴ Government Exhibit 003-0003; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.

¹⁵ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.2-3.

¹⁶ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.2. Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.1.

¹⁷ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.15.

¹⁸ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.3.

New Influx from the Middle East: the 1970s

It is clear that, like any broad organization, there were times of adaptation and growth. After their initial years in the United States, members of the Muslim Brotherhood began to expand in different directions. Continuing from the personal account of Zeid al-Noman, as taken from an exhibit presented in United States of America v. Holy Land Foundation:

“In the beginning of the 70’s (sic) a new era started. We can call it the stage of codification. The people put together the first bylaws. (...) There started to be an emphasis on the Ikhwan’s formula for this Movement. Prior to this stage, young elements came to America, (e)specially Gulf elements or Saudi elements which joined the ranks of the Movement regularly.”¹⁹

“In 1972, the Muslim Kuwaiti Youths Association was founded which was later developed in 1976 into the Muslim Arab Youths Association and its work centered around the Muslim students coming to America from all the Arab countries. It developed significantly during the eighties and the Ikhwan play a fundamental role in leading and directing it at the leadership and the grassroots levels.”²⁰

In the second half of the 1970s an “*era of dedication for general activism began*,” according to Zeid al-Noman:²¹ “The first Ikhwan’s plan was the five-year plan the Ikhwans put together lasting from ’75-’80. Its primary focus was general work and dedication to the general work organizations.”²² This phase led not only to stronger ties between the North American Brotherhood members, but also to an increasing emphasis on secrecy, as well as the imposition of the need for long-term planning. It was also a time of deep internal divisions within the movement and bitter rivalries. Al-Noman writes:

“During the same time, the Ikhwan’s foreign connections became strong and that was due to the fundraising campaigns which were launched by the Ikhwans which made it possible for the Ikhwans in the leadership to meet (the) leadership from the Orient. Therefore, membership here of the brothers who were members in their countries was easier, more easier. Those people come to the Movement and found some organizational practices such as means and priorities which were different from the ones they were accustomed to in their countries. So, they started to inquire, “Where is the strictness in the conditions? And where are these conditions? Where is the secrecy, where is (the) organizational connection and where are the educational programs? What are the goals of the Group here? What are the goals of these programs?” All of these questions were resurfacing on the field anew. Therefore, regional organizational pockets started to form during this time period. Also, rumors and suspicions started to circulate among the ranks of the Group regarding individuals in the leadership. So, the Movement’s then-current situation exploded during the camp of ’77 and a new leadership came on board in ’78 whose work was bitter as it was trying to purge the Group’s body from regional restrictions and gatherings of from the organizational pockets and tied its parts together but, during this time period, it was a non-harmonious leadership and going back and forth was evident in its positions.”²³

In his memo, al-Noman makes a particularly interesting comment about the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. and in the Middle East:

“Our methods and means are different from the Orient unless it was compatible with the reality of the Islamic Movement over here. Our methods are always driven from the nature of the organizational base, from the nature of the country which is America and also from

¹⁹ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.3.

²⁰ Government Exhibit 003-0003; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.

²¹ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.4.

²² Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.7.

²³ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.4.

the nature of the base from which we move, the people we move between are mostly highly-educated youth. (...) They are more aware than the youth who are of the same stage or age in the Orient.”²⁴

“The conferences of ‘77, ‘78 and ‘79 used to end with tears and pain but (...) were very important for what happened after that. This time period was characterized by change; a change in Ikhwan who wanted to change the status quo and others who want to maintain the status quo. (...) For the first time actual accountability of the leadership was enacted even though this accountability was unfair at times. In the past, leadership was seen as a group of infallible Ikhwan. Therefore, holding them accountable was rare or simple.”²⁵

“In 1976, the Malaysian Group for Islamic Studies was founded and it now has an annual conference (attended by 600 students in 1990), a leadership conference and other camps in various regions. Its work is centered on the students coming from Malaysia and Southeast Asia. The leadership of the Ikhwan plays a general role in directing the Malaysian Group.”²⁶

Professionalization: The 1980s

The time of turmoil led to a more structured Brotherhood organization in the United States, with a centralized leadership and the formation of many of the organizations that continue to function today, as discussed below. For the first time the leadership sought to build permanent structures with the idea of settling permanently in various U.S. cities. According to al-Noman:

“The elections of ‘79 came along and the Shura Council came in ‘80 and ‘81 and the road in front of it was paved and the Shura Council came in ‘80 and ‘81 and the road in front of it was paved and work began to unify the Group’s ranks, codification of work and pushing the Movement’s forward. For the first time then, we had a General Masul who was dedicated to the Group’s affairs alone and also the Shura Council started to play its true role which is planning and monitoring the executive leadership. The executive leadership was carrying its tasks through a Shura atmosphere and continuous contacts. Its meetings were held consistently on monthly basis.”²⁷

“In 1980, the Muslim Students Union was developed into the Islamic Society in North America (ISNA) to include all the Muslim congregations from immigrants and citizens, and to be a nucleus for the Islamic Movement in North America...The ISNA has developed significantly in the eighties but the Ikhwan’s leadership and direction of it started to gradually decrease due to their scarce presence in it.”²⁸

The second five-year plan for 1981-1985 was focused on self-structure and the settlement of the Dawa’a, including trying to increase the influence of the Brotherhood in organizations that were evolving among young Muslim immigrants.²⁹ Al-Noman writes:

“By ‘Settlement of the Dawa’a’, the Muslim Brotherhood Dawa’a is meant. It is not meant to spread Islam as spread of Islam is a general thing and it is indeed a goal for each Muslim in general terms. The second thing is the settlement of the Dawa’a and finding permanent fundamentals in the cities where Ikhwan now live in order for them to be the meeting points for the coming brothers...In 1985, the Youths Organization in North America was founded as an independent organization but with a relationship with the ISNA. The Ikhwan played no role in founding it and directing it but the matter is gradually improving.

²⁴ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.10.

²⁵ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.4.

²⁶ Government Exhibit 003-0003; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.

²⁷ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.5.

²⁸ Government Exhibit 003-0003; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.

²⁹ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.7.

Its work is centered on the children of the Muslim congregations from immigrants and citizens in North America. It has a general annual conference and regional conferences across the continent.”³⁰

Contradicting this claim is the fact that Ahmed Elkadi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States between 1984 and 1994, helped to create several Islamic organizations, including the Muslim Youth of North America. This organization attempted to draw thousands of high school students to Islam by sponsoring soccer teams, providing scholarships, and offering a line of clothing.³¹

Front Groups and Weapons Training

This phase also brought the explicit use of front groups and a more sophisticated division of labor among the different Brotherhood groups, including seeking media exposure. However, secrecy and compartmentalization of work were stressed. Zeid al-Noman emphasized both in his extensive discourse, highlighting the care that must be put into the formation of front groups, while explicitly naming the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP) as one of those groups:

“[Fronts groups are] one method to communicate the Ikhwan’s point of view. A front is not formed until after a study and after an exhaustive study. I mean, the last front formed by the Group is the Islamic Association for Palestine. So, Ikhwans, this did not come out over night, or it was not the Ikhwnans who are in charge went to sleep, dreamed about it and met the next day and decided to do it. Not at all, by God. This went through lengthy meetings and took long discussions.”³²

The focus of the Brotherhood efforts at this time was the IAP.

“In 1981, the Ikhwan founded the Islamic Association of Palestine to serve the cause of Palestine on the political and the media fronts. The Association has absorbed most of the Ikhwan’s Palestinian energy at the leadership and the grassroots levels in addition to some of the brothers from the other countries. Attention was given to the Arab new arrivals, immigrants and citizens in general, while focusing on the Palestinians in particular. The Association’s work had developed a great deal since its inception, particularly with the formation of the Palestine Committee, the beginning of the Intifada at the end of 1987 and the proclamation of the Hamas movement. The Association has organizations affiliated with it such as (The United Association for Studies & Research, The Occupied Land Fund and The Media Office), dedicated main personnel, several periodicals, research, studies and field branches in all the regions.”³³

In 1982-1983 the main goals of the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. were, according to Zeid al-Noman:

“Strengthening the internal structure, administrative discipline, recruitment and settlement of the Dawa’a, energizing the organizations’ work, energizing the political work fronts. As for the secondary goals, they are eight: first, financing and investment; second, foreign relations; third reviving women’s activity; four, political awareness to members of the Group; five, securing the Group; six, special activity; seven, media; eight, benefiting from human potentials.”³⁴

³⁰ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.8.

³¹ Government Exhibit 003-0003; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.

³² Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.12; Noreen Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe and Laurie Cohen, “A Rare Look at Secretive Brotherhood in America,” *The Chicago Tribune*, Sept. 19, 2004.

³³ Government Exhibit 003-0003; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.

³⁴ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.. p.9.

The need for security and vigilance against outside forces was becoming a growing concern. It also appears that the Brothers had developed some sort of military capacity. This is clear from the exchange between al-Noman and an unidentified questioner, who asks if the Special Activity (see point six, “special activity” in above paragraph) referred to military work. Al Noman responded:

“Special work’ means military work. ‘Securing the Group’ is the Groups’ security, the Group’s security against outside dangers. For instance, to monitor suspicious movement (...) which exist on the American front such as Zionism, Masonry...etc. Monitoring the suspicious movements or the sides, the government bodies such as the CIA, FBI...etc, so that we can find out if they are monitoring us, are we not being monitored, how can we get rid of them.”³⁵

Almost immediately afterward, he went on to clarify and talk about Brotherhood weapons training in the United States: “[I]t is not possible to have military training in Jordan, for instance, while here in America there is (sic) weapons training in many of the Ikhwan camps (...)”³⁶ A little further on, al-Noman returns to the topic, describing how in some areas, such as Oklahoma, weapons training has become more difficult because the authorities “started to get strict about letting Muslims use the camps. They would ask them, for instance, to submit their name and they would ask you to bring an ID or something to prove our name.”³⁷ However, he said that “here in Missouri” the Brothers could still “request a camp that has a range, a shooting range, and one which has a range to shoot, one which has a range which they use for shooting. You could find that in some of the camps.”³⁸

The Formation of Hamas and the 1990s

A defining moment for the Brotherhood in the United States (and elsewhere) was the 1987 formation of Hamas as an armed group. What set Hamas apart from other Islamist groups was its public and organic link to the Muslim Brotherhood. Article 2 of the Hamas Charter states that:

“The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement of modern times. It is characterized by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgment ,the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam.”³⁹

This explicit endorsement of Hamas by the U.S. Group, carries over to many other documents, many of them relating to the first *intifada*, or Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas was a major participant in the *intifada* and worked to sabotage the 1993 Oslo Accords that brought a virtual end to that round of violence. The Group organizations supported the *intifada* and repeatedly reiterated the link of the Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas. As one 1992 Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) memo noted:

“With the increase of the Intifada and the advance of the Islamic action inside and outside Palestine, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), provided through its activities in resisting the Zionist occupation a lot of sacrifices from martyrs, detainees, wounded, injured, fugitives and deportees and it was able to prove that it is an original and an effective movement in leading the Palestinian people...This Movement—which was bred in

³⁵ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.. p.13.

³⁶ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.. p.13.

³⁷ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.. p.18.

³⁸ Government Exhibit 003-0089; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.. p.18.

³⁹ http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/iap_hamascharter.pdf.

the bosom of the mother movement, 'The Muslim Brotherhood'—restored hope and life to the Muslim nation and the notion that the flare of Jihad has not died out and that the banner of Islamic Jihad is still raised."⁴⁰

This is not an isolated statement, but one that is a theme in much of the Group's deliberations. A December 1990 memorandum titled "Lessons and Morals from the Reality of Intifada Work," begins by saying:

" Hamas is a Godly gift to the Palestinian people, the Muslim nation and the International Islamic Movement: like the gift of the Afghani Jihad; and the establishment of the nation of Islam in Sudan; and the triumph Islam and Muslim in several places (Algeria, Jordan, Malaysia, Turkey...; the fall of Communism and the liberation of Islamic states; the endurance of the International Movement in face of many shocks (The Gulf crisis, the internal conflicts..)"⁴¹

The same document hints at internal security problems for the Brotherhood and a direct role in trying to counter the information coming from the confessions of arrested *Ikhwan* members (possibly Hamas members, but not explicitly stated in the document) in Israel and the Palestinian territories. The document says that the "discovery of moles" does not mean "that the movement is destroyed."⁴² The document analyzes why some of those captured confess, and how to mitigate the damage, particularly by using dead drops (a technique utilized to covertly pass material), further compartmentalizing Brotherhood work and adding security precautions.

At the same time, it is clear that the Brotherhood groups in the United States were steadily branching off and building groups that were to be perceived as independent entities, but in reality were all linked and to this day, it appears many still are. A document titled "Annual Report for year 89-1990, Presented to the Organizational Conference," states that:

"The Central Committee for Palestinian Activism in America is in charge of planning, directing and following up on all work related to and connected to the Group. It includes several committees and organizations, some of which are: The Islamic Association of Palestine, the Occupied Land Fund, The United Association for Studies and Research, the Office of Foreign Affairs, The Investment Committee, The Rehabilitation Committee, the Medical Committee and the Legal Committee."⁴³

This is an unambiguous statement by the Brotherhood (Group) linking the IAP, the OLF (which later became the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development),⁴⁴ and the United Association for Studies and Research (USAR), the Group's main think tank for many years. The same document notes that the HLF invested \$100,000 in real estate with an ICNA-affiliated group, further indications of a strong relationship.⁴⁵ In order to bolster its outreach capabilities, the Group helped form the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) in 1994. CAIR is first mentioned by name in the Brotherhood documents as part of the July 30, 1994 agenda of the Palestine Committee.⁴⁶ CAIR would grow to become the leading *Ikhwan* voice in the media and become the most prominent public face of the Group. CAIR's leadership was taken directly from the IAP and Palestine Committee.

⁴⁰ Government Exhibit 003-0015; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/iap_internalmemo.pdf.

⁴¹ Government Exhibit 003-0010; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p. 1.

⁴² Government Exhibit 003-0010; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p. 1.

⁴³ Government Exhibit 003-005; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p. 3.

⁴⁴ Government Exhibit 003-008; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p. 6. It is interesting to note that the name change from Occupied Land Fund to Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development was made after extensive consultations inside and outside the Brotherhood organization.

⁴⁵ Government Exhibit 003-008; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p. 6.

⁴⁶ Government Exhibit 003-0078; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p. 6
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/palcomm_meetingminutes.pdf.

Omar Ahmad and Nihad Awad, who co-founded CAIR and serve as CAIR's chairman emeritus and executive director, respectively, were listed as individual members of the Brotherhood's Palestine Committee in America. Ahmad and Awad also served as president and public relations director of the IAP, respectively. Interestingly, the exhibits show, on Oct. 5, 1994 CAIR received a \$5,000 donation from the HLF, with the notation "CBS" in the memo line.⁴⁷ Just two days before, CBS had aired a piece identifying the HLF and IAP as groups funding Hamas.⁴⁸ The story led to a major outcry by *Ikhwān*-related groups, protesting the innocence of the groups, and it seems reasonable to assume that the money was given to CAIR to help fund the efforts to counter the CBS story, which included a letter-writing campaign and public protestations of the innocence of the named groups.

What makes the donation notable is that, in written testimony before the U.S. Congress, CAIR Executive Director Nihad Awad stated that it was "an outright lie" to say CAIR had received any money from the HLF, as Steve Emerson of the Investigative Project had stated. In his testimony, Awad challenged Emerson to produce "even a shred of evidence to support his ridiculous claim" that his group had received any such donation.⁴⁹ At the time the existence of the check was unknown to Congressional investigators or the law enforcement community. Given that such a donation was not illegal or unexpected, such a vehement (and false) denial raises interesting questions that can only be answered by accepting the Group's definition of itself as a clandestine organization that cannot reveal its true nature or the ties among different entities that make up the Group.

This desire to obscure the real nature of different Group organizations carries over into their security preparations. In an undated security manual, everything from classification systems to compartmentalization of information, secure meeting protocols, sweeping for bugs, and other issues are addressed. In addition, protocols on establishing what could be said publicly, how to quickly destroy documents, and how different parts of the Group could interact and contact each other are carefully outlined.⁵⁰ As with receiving donations from a legitimate organization, there is nothing illegal in this operation, but it is not in keeping with the behavior of normal charitable organizations. It is, however, consistent with the behavior of front organizations seeking to hide their true identities and purposes.

One of the key strategies employed in setting up different front groups and organizations appears to have been to use family members to hold important, interlocking positions within different organizations. These family members, in turn, often were related to Hamas leaders.⁵¹ While familial relationships are not proof of criminal association or guilt, the use of family members to insure secrecy and compartmentalization within organizations is common tradecraft in clandestine groups.

The Smoking Gun

The need for trusted cadres working on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States is evident if one understands the Group's self-articulated goals in this country.

⁴⁷ http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/hlf_cair_5k.pdf.

⁴⁸ CBS Evening News Transcript, Oct. 3, 1994. The network later issued a minor correction on Oct. 28 because it had incorrectly shown video of a mosque that was not linked to any of the mentioned entities.

⁴⁹ Written Testimony of Nihad Awad Before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, "Terrorism: Two Years After 9/11, Connecting Dots, American Muslim Community Under Siege," September 10, 2003, <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/MB/nihad.pdf>.

⁵⁰ Government Exhibit 002-0101; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., English translation begins on page 12. <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/securitymanual.pdf>.

⁵¹ To make this point the government prepared the following chart showing some of the family ties: <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/HLF/familiallinks.pdf>.

One document titled “An Explanatory Memorandum; On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America”⁵² stands out as being of particular importance because it so clearly and unambiguously articulates the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood, articulated elsewhere by Yousef al Qaradawi and other *Ikhwan* leaders, in the context of the Brotherhood efforts inside the United States. Dated May 22, 1991, it is important both for its content as well as its authoritative authorship, carrying the weight of the *Shura Council* and the Organizational Conference of 1987.

The author, Mohamed Akram, is probably the same person as Dr. Mohamed Akram Adlouni (or Adluni). At the time of writing, Adlouni was one of the key players within the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. He was a member of the Shura Council and five departments within the apparatus including, the Planning department; the Special Committee and the Secretary of the Palestine Committee.⁵³ Currently Adlouni is the Secretary General of the International al-Quds Foundation in Lebanon and the director of the al-Quds International Institute.⁵⁴ (It is interesting to note that the International al-Quds Foundation is headed by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the most influential *Ikhwan* thinkers and theologians of recent decades.)

In order to establish his authority in the Explanatory Memorandum, Adlouni states that his authority is derived from the 1987 *Shura Council* and Organizational Conference of 1987, the highest governing bodies of the Brotherhood in the United States. To claim this authority he quotes the group’s agreed goals from that conference, including:

“Enablement of Islam in North America, meaning: establishing an effective and stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood which adopts Muslims’ causes domestically and globally, and which works to expand the observant Muslim base, aims at unifying and directing Muslims’ efforts, presents Islam as a civilization alternative, and supports the global Islamic state wherever it is.”⁵⁵

After going into some detail in establishing the relevance and authority of his missive, Adlouni spends considerable time on the fundamental concept of settlement, central to the Muslim Brotherhood-led efforts in North America. He describes settlement as necessary so “*That Islam and its Movement become a part of the homeland it lives in.*” The process of settlement is also defined as follows:

“In order for Islam and its Movement to become “a part of the homeland” in which it lives, “stable” in its land, “rooted” in the spirits and minds of its people, “enabled” in the live of its society and has firmly established “organizations” on which the Islamic structure is built and with which the testimony of civilization is achieved, the Movement must plan and struggle to obtain “the keys” and the tools of this process in carry out this grand mission as a “Civilization Jihadist” responsibility which lies on the shoulders of Muslims and – on top of them – the Muslim Brotherhood in this country...”⁵⁶

This last statement clarifies that the concept of settlement is not intended solely to allow the *Ikhwan*-led Muslims in North America to live peacefully, but is, in fact, part of *jihad* or holy war for the conquest of the land by Islam. Adlouni is clear when he writes about the role of the Muslim Brother in North America, built on his previous statements, and is also clear that the Brothers must understand both the gravity and importance of their undertaking in the process of settlement:

“The process of settlement is a “Civilization-Jihadist Process” with all the word means. The *Ikhwan* must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is

⁵² Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al.

⁵³ Government Exhibit 003-0064; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.8; Government Exhibit 003-0001; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.3-4.

⁵⁴ <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/MB/AlQuds2.pdf>;
<http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/MB/AlQuds.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p. 18.

⁵⁶ Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p. 19.

made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim's destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and the Mujahedeen be equal."⁵⁷

The writer understands that the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. is not strong enough to perform the "*Civilization Jihad*" on its own but clearly sees the Muslim Brothers as the vanguard.

"As for the role of the Ikhwan, it is the initiative, pioneering, leadership, raising the banner and pushing people in that direction. They are then to work to employ, direct and unify Muslims' efforts and powers for this process. In order to do that, we must possess a mastery of the art of "coalitions", the art of "absorption" and the principles of "cooperation".⁵⁸ "We need to adopt the principle which says, "Take from people...the best they have", their best specializations, experiences, arts, energies and abilities. By people here we mean those within or without the ranks of individuals and organizations. (...) To me, there is no choice for us other than alliance and mutual understanding of those who desire from our religion and those who agree from our belief in work. And the U.S. Islamic arena is full of those waiting..., the pioneers."⁵⁹

To emphasize the strength of the Group, the author concludes by listing 29 groups under the heading: "A List of our organizations and the organizations of our friends [Imagine if they all march according to one plan!!!]."⁶⁰ Those listed include the Islamic Society of North America, the Muslim Student Association, the North American Islamic Trust, the Muslim Arab Youth Association, the International Institute of Islamic Thought, and the Occupied Land Fund (later the HLF) and other groups that continue to operate publicly as independent groups with no ties to each other or to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Conclusion

The documents demonstrate unambiguously that the international Muslim Brotherhood has, for more than three decades, carried out a systematic plan to wage "civilization jihad" against the United States, with the aims of making the nation part of the broader Islamic *caliphate* or Muslim global state. This has been the task of the inter-related organizations that make up the Muslim Brotherhood presence here. While membership in the Muslim Brotherhood is not illegal, the Group has shown a keen desire to portray each group as independent and unaffiliated within the *Ikhwan* structure. To this end, strict security measures have been implemented in the organizations and security and secrecy are sources of worry and discussion.

The documents also show that while not publicly advocating violence, the Brotherhood has engaged in weapons training and has maintained a specific, clandestine security branch to monitor law enforcement and intelligence agencies' interest in the Brotherhood activities. It is interesting to note that none of the documents deal with the stated goals of the Group organizations, such as protecting the legal rights of Muslims or insuring their civil rights are honored. Rather, in both tone and tenor, the documents deal with the advancement of the "civilization-jihad" theme in different ways, demonstrating that this was the primary goal of these organizations since their inception.

The initial verdict in the trial of the Holy Land Foundation leaves the case unresolved. A new trial, promised by the Department of Justice, may result in a less ambiguous verdict. But whether criminal culpability for funding terrorism is found or not, the documents make clear that the Muslim Brotherhood and its multiple organizations in this country are seeking an agenda far different from the one they publicly claim to advocate.

⁵⁷ Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.21.

⁵⁸ Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.21.

⁵⁹ Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.22.

⁶⁰ Government Exhibit 003-0085; 3:04-CR-240-G; U.S. v. HLF, et al., p.32.